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NOTES
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
IS DISCRETION STILL THE BETTER PART OF VALOR?
"The vision was rationality in criminal sentencing ....
The vision was consistency in criminal sentencing ....
With the guidelines promulgated today, however,
the vision dims."'
"[T]he Sentencing Guideline system is a failure - a
dismal failure."2
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 triggered
sweeping changes in the administration of justice on the federal
level.4 Perhaps the most important provision of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 was that which created the United States
Sentencing Commission.' The Commission was charged with the
development of a set of sentencing guidelines which would
completely alter the method by which defendants convicted of
federal crimes are sentenced, in order to promote certainty and
fairness in criminal sentencing while avoiding unwarranted sentence
'Dissenting view of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the promulgation of
Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg.
18121 (1987) [hereinafter Robinson's Dissent].
2 Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11,
1992, at 2 (Perspective Column). The Honorable Jose A. Cabranes is a United States
District Judge for the District of Connecticut.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984).
' Portions of the Act modify bail standards, criminal forfeiture, drug trafficking
offenses, computer fraud, and the insanity defense, as well as other aspects of
federal criminal law and procedure. See generally B. JAMES GEORGE, JR.,
CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE, VOLUME 2 OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 (Supp. 1990).
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988 & Supp. I 1989) [hereinafter referred to as the
Commission]. Attacks on the Commission based on separation of powers and
nondelegation arguments have been rejected. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S.
361 (1989). For a general overview of the Commission, see 1990 U.S. SENTENCING
CoMM. ANN. REP. at 1-6 [hereinafter U.S.S.C. ANN. REP.].
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disparities.6 The importance of the Commission was underscored in
a statement by then Attorney General William French Smith:
Of the improvements [under consideration by the
Committee] ... perhaps the most important are those

related to sentencing criminal offenders. These
provisions introduce a totally new and
comprehensive sentencing system that is based on a
coherent philosophy. They rely upon detailed
guidelines for sentencing similarly situated offenders
in order to provide for a greater certainty and
uniformity in sentencing.7
The Guidelines8 were formulated to achieve the three basic
policy goals set out in their introduction: honesty, uniformity, and
proportionality in sentencing." To meet this charge, the Commission
developed a system of guidelines that represents an attempt to
combine many competing sentencing considerations into a workable
scheme.1° The Guidelines, which went into effect on November 1,
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). For a general discussion comparing the
previous method of federal sentencing and the subsequent change under the
Guidelines, see Project: Nineteenth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure:United States
6

Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEo. L.J. 1229 (1990) [hereinafter
Project]; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-67.
7 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4 at 3221.
8 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1991)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G]. Individual Guidelines will hereinafter be cited only by
guideline number within the Guidelines Manual, for example U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For
a description of the arrangement of the Guidelines within the Manual, see U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.6.
9 U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro, comment. (n.3). In the view of the Commission, the
sentencing goal of honesty was summarily achieved by the abolition of parole for
federal offenses. Id.
10 Id. at n.4. For example, a system which is based entirely on proportionality,
treating each case on entirely an individual basis, necessarily conflicts with the
ideal of uniformity, or the equal treatment of similar cases. The Guidelines were
designed to balance these, and several other, competing considerations. Id.
Commentators have criticized the Guidelines for their failure to adopt a controlling
sentencing rationale. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?Reflections
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938, 1952-53 (1988).
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1987,11 follow a sentencing grid, which is composed of two axes. 2
The vertical axis represents the offense level. 3 Most, but not all,
federal offenses are assigned a base offense level by the
Guidelines.' To this base offense level, additions and deductions
are made pursuant to various Guidelines, depending on the
offender's role in the offense.' The horizontal axis is the criminal
history category and represents an analysis of the defendant's past
criminal history. 6 Where the two axes intersect, a range, of months
represents the range of incarceration 7 from which the sentencing
u18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). The fact that the Commission was under a severely
constrained timetable when developing the Guidelines may have contributed to
their shortcomings. See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1939,1949 (the Commission held
only two days of public hearings on its final draft of the Guidelines, which, without
having been tested, was submitted to Congress one month later).
12 U.S.S.G. § 5A.
13 Id.
14See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1-2X4.1. Robinson's Dissent faults the Guidelines because
they fail to provide offense levels for many significant offenses. Robinson's Dissent,
supra note 1, at 18126. This factor is "likely to breed disparity." Id. The Guidelines
have also been criticized because "[tlhey appear to have been written by lawyers
with little or no understanding of the complexities of tax crimes .... ." Leonard R.
Rosenblatt & Vivian Shevitz, The Sentencing Guidelines and Tax Cases: Too Much
Written; Not Enough Said, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1991, at 1. The Commission only
recently promulgated a complex set of guidelines pertaining to corporate
defendants. See U.S.S.G. §§ 8A1.1-8E1.3; see also Barbara Franklin, Meting Out a
Sentence: Complex Guidelines Undergo Final Scrutiny, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 5;
Stanley S. Arkin, Sentencing Guidelinesand Law Firm Criminal Liability, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
10, 1991, at 3 (analyzing the effect of the new corporate guidelines on law firms).
The adjustments may be based either on a specific aspect of the crime or may
stem from a more general aspect of the defendant's conduct. Compare U.S.S.G. §
2C1.2 with U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2 is entitled "Offering, Giving, Soliciting,
or Receiving a Gratuity" and is assigned a base offense level of 7. Subsection
(b)(2)(B) provides for an 8 level increase if the gratuity was given to an elected
official. This is a type of increase based on the existence of a specific characteristic
of the offense. Conversely, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, entitled "Aggravating Role," provides
for a 2-4 offense level increase based on the defendant's leadership role in the
crime. This type of increase is a more generalized assessment of the defendant's
conduct, independent of the underlying offense.
16 See U.S.S.G. § 5A.
" Id. For example, the intersection of an offense level of fifteen and a criminal
history category of II produces a Guideline sentence range of 21-27 months.
Recently proposed amendments to the Guidelines would allow greater
opportunities for probation for first time offenders, a prospect one federal judge
termed a "Christmas present." Deborah Pines, Changes Seen Likely in Rules On
Sentencing; Alternatives to Prison Are Likely Amendments, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at

358

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

judge must choose a definite sentence. 8 Provisions of the
Guidelines provide for a departure from this range in certain
circumstances. 9
This Note analyzes some of the many appellate decisions"
which have stemmed from sentencing under the Guidelines,2' in an
effort to determine whether the Guidelines are fulfilling their stated
purposes of uniformity and proportionality.'
The inquiry will
focus on certain Guidelines which are the most commonly applied.'
Certain procedural aspects of the Guidelines will also be
scrutinized. 4

1 (quoting United States District Judge Vincent L. Broderick (S.D.N.Y.)). The
relevant proposed amendments appear at 57 Fed. Reg. 90, 105-11 (1992).
18See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1(h)-(i). One judge described the Guidelines as a "Rube
Goldberg system where no one who participates [in the sentencing hearing] can
reasonably be expected to know what is going on, particularly the criminal
defendant." Ann Pelham, Circuit Conference: At Work and Play, LEGAL TIMES, May
28, 1990, at 7 (quoting United State District Judge Jose A. Cabranes). A journalist
likened the Guideline sentencing procedure to "some child's game of Chutes and
Ladders ...." David Margolick, Full Spectrum of Judicial Critics Assail Prison
Sentencing Guides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 40. See also Project, supra note 6, at
1230.
19Approximately 83.4% of defendants are sentenced within the Guideline range;
2.3% are sentenced above the Guideline range and 14.4% are sentenced below it.
U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 69.
" Appellate review of Guideline sentences is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)
(1988) and is limited to sentences imposed in violation of law, imposed as a result
of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, or to sentences unreasonably
departing from the Guideline sentence range.
2 In 1990, over 29,000 federal criminal defendants were sentenced under the
Guidelines. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 38. Of course, not all of these cases
were reported.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Of the 325 questions received by the Technical Assistance Service of the
Commission concerning offense level adjustments, 179, or 55%, concerned issues
relating to adjustments based on the defendant's role in the offense, obstruction of
justice, or acceptance of responsibility, while 288 of the 2112 total questions, or 14%,
pertained to the calculation of the criminal history. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note
5, at 105 (Table X).
24 See infra notes 25-60.
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I. PROCEDURE

A. Burden of Proof
An initial source of ambiguity within the Guidelines stems
from their failure :to articulate .the appropriate standard of proof
2
governing fact finding under the Guideline system of sentencing. 5
In a pre-Guidelines case, the Supreme 'Court held that the
preponderance standard satisfies due process when the fact finding
is undertaken for sentencing purposes. 6 When confronted with this
question regarding Guideline sentencing, federal appellate courts
have followed the Supreme Court's lead in McMillan.27 Guideline
sentencing, therefore, is generally conducted under a preponderance
of the evidence standard.
While the general burden of proof standard -remains
z For example, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, entitled "Restraint of Victim," states "[ilf a
victim was physically restrained in the course of the offense, increase by 2 levels."
Although "physically restrained" is a defined term, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment:
(n.1(i)), nowhere do the Guidelines mention the standard to which the government
must prove the restraint, for example, beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear, and
convincing evidence, or by a preponderance of the evidence. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3.
' McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.' 79 (1986).
In finding that the
preponderance standard satisfies due process requirements, the Court noted that
"[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any
prescribed burden of proof at all." Id. at 91. See also Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977). Individual due process attacks on the' Guidelines, such as the
burden of proof question, were not contemplated by Mistretta. See United States
v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2594 (1990); United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531 (6th Cir. 1989), 'on
remand, 730 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D Ohio 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 945 F.2d 1337 (6th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds and reh'g granted,No. 90-3205, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
28543 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1991); United States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S 1092 (1990); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1989); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
McDowell, 888 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879
F.2d 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989); United States v. Wright,.873
F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989). See also Robert E. Hanlon, The Second Circuit Review - 19861987 Term: CriminalProcedure:Hard Time Lightly Given: The Standard of Persuasionat
Sentencing: United States v. Lee, a/k/a "Monkey," 54 BROOK. L. REv. 465 (1988)
(analyzing the preponderance standard affecting a Guidelines case); Richard
Husseini, Comment: The FederalSentencing Guidelines:Adopting Clear and Convincing
Evidence as the Burden of Proof,57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1387 (1990).
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unchallenged, recent attacks on the fact finding procedure have
honed in on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.'*
The issue generally arises when a government agent testifies at the
sentencing hearing or is quoted in the pre-sentence report concerning
an aspect of uncharged relevant conduct 9 which the government
requests the sentencing court consider in imposing sentence.' The
agent provides the data based not on personal knowledge, but rather
on hearsay information provided by a confidential government
informant.3' The Eighth Circuit found that such a procedure ran
afoul of the Confrontation Clause; the Third Circuit perceived no
Confrontation Clause barrier to such testimony.32 To muddle
matters further, the Sixth Circuit initially ruled that such a sentencing
procedure violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him,33 but later vacated its
opinion and granted rehearing on this issue.' This inter-circuit
conflict, sharpened by the confusion in the Sixth Circuit, is thus ripe
for Supreme Court review. The Commission's responsibility to
develop a comprehensive scheme of federal sentencinges has thus
been abdicated in this area in favor of a judicial resolution.
B. Burden of Persuasion
Following the effective date of the Guidelines,3 there were
also some procedural questions as to which party bore the burden of
proof for offense level increases and decreases. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee concluded that the
'The

Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
Relevant conduct is an important aspect of Guideline sentencing. See infra
notes 40-56, 110 and accompanying text.
o See United States v. Silverman, 945 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir.), vacated and reh'g
granted, No. 90-3205, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28543 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1991) (en banc).
31See United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103 (8th Cir. 1990).
32 Compare id. at 103-04 with United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-05
(3d Cir. 1990).
' Silverman, 945 F.2d 1337.
34 United States v. Silverman, No. 90-3205,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28543 (6th Cir.
Dec. 4, 1991) (en banc).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994-95 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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government bore the burden for offense level increases and that it
had the burden of persuasion in proving that the defendant was not
entitled to an offense level decrease.37 This approach has not been
well received, and the vast majority of other federal courts follow the
rule that the party seeking the adjustment should bear the burden of
The government, therefore, bears the burden in
persuasion.'
seeking sentence level increases and the defendant for decreases.
The distinction, at least in the Eastern District of Tennessee, still
exists. It is beyond comprehension that the Commission did not
anticipate the need to articulate the procedural issues delineated
above. Indeed, these procedural matters are of fundamental concern
to the operation of an efficient Guideline sentencing system. With no
guidance from the Commission, the judiciary has been forced to
decide issues more properly in the hands of the independent
Commission. 39 The sentencing goal of uniformity has therefore
been usurped, with individual courts filling the void left by the
Guidelines' ambiguity.
C. Double Jeopardy Impact of Guideline Sentences
The Guidelines encourage sentencing judges to consider a
wide variety of relevant conduct in selecting the appropriate
3 United States v. Dolan, 701 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Tenn. 1988), affd sub nom.

United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1989) (decrease for acceptance of
responsibility).
' See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ehret, 885 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493
U.S. 1062 (1990); United States v. Urrego-Linares 879 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). These cases stand for the proposition that by forcing the
party seeking the adjustment to carry the burden of persuasion, the Guideline base
offense level will remain accurate. By negative analogy, if the Dolan approach were
the rule rather than the exception, when a defendant is charged with a crime with
an offense level of 20, the offense level would in actuality be 18 unless and until
the government could prove the defendant was not entitled to a 2 level decrease
for acceptance of responsibility. The aforementioned courts concluded that this
approach "undermines the carefully set sentencing ranges under the Guidelines."
Howard, 894 F.2d at 1090. Additionally, the party seeking the adjustment is usually
in the best position to provide the necessary information.
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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sentence.'
The Guidelines do not, however, contemplate the
Double Jeopardy 4 implications of consideration of relevant conduct.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered this issue of
potentially monumental importance in United States v. Koonce.' In
Koonce, the defendant was prosecuted in the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota for distribution of
methamphetamine.' Following his arrest, authorities searched the
defendant's Utah home and seized additional quantities of
narcotics." The seized narcotics from Koonce's Utah home were not
charged in the South Dakota indictment.4' Following a jury trial,
Koonce was convicted of the distribution charge, the only count of
the indictment.46 At sentencing, the district court considered the
additional quantity of narcotics seized from Koonce's Utah home as
conduct relevant to his South Dakota distribution conviction.47 The
district court figured the weight of the narcotics seized from the
defendant's home into the Guideline base offense level.' The South
Dakota conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.4 9 The
United States then charged Koonce in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah with possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute based on the same quantity of narcotics
which was considered in his South Dakota sentence.s" The district
court denied Koonce's Double Jeopardy claims," and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed in an interlocutory appeal, remanding the case to the
40 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; see also William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495

(1990).
" The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.

F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
United State v. Koonce, 884 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1989).
"Id.
42945

's

Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1147.

Koonce, 884 F.2d at 350-51.
Id. at 352; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
I7
48 Koonce, 884 F.2d at 352.
49 Id. at 354.
s United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1991).
S'Id.
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district court for trial.5 2 Following his Utah conviction, Koonce
again appealed his Double Jeopardy claim to the Tenth Circuit,
which this time ruled in his favor,' finding that "[i]n both the Utah
proceeding and the South Dakota proceeding, defendant was
punished for the exact same conduct, the possession of Utah
methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Absent evidence that
Congress intended such double punishment, this runs afoul of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.","
Given the importance of relevant conduct to Guideline
sentencing,' the ramifications of the Koonce case are apparent.Koonce is indicative of the Commission's failure to foresee the
complexities inherent in its Guideline scheme. Appellate courts,
therefore, must by default formulate the comprehensive sentencing
policy which Congress left in the hands of the Commission.
D. Notice of Intent to Departfrom the Guideline Range
The Guidelines do not prescribe a comprehensive procedural
methodology to be followed in departing from the applicable
Guideline sentence range. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require that a sentencing court afford the parties "an
opportunity to comment upon... matters relating to the appropriate
sentence,"' the Guidelines are unclear as to whether a defendant is
entitled to advance notice of the district court's sua sponte intent to
depart.' The Guidelines' failure to address this important issue
52United

States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1989), modified, 945 F.2d

1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
' Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1154.
5 Id. at 1150.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
5 It is not entirely clear what effect Koonce would have on a converse fact
pattern, that is, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars conduct from a previous
conviction from being considered as relevant conduct in a subsequent prosecution.
57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1).
- See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 ("When any factor important to the sentencing
determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate
opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor."). Note that
the issue presented in this subsection addresses only a sua sponte decision of the
district court to depart from the Guideline sentence range. If it is the prosecution
which seeks the departure, the defendant would be afforded advance notice by
virtue of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49, which provides that "[wiritten
motions ... written notices, . . . and similar papers shall be served upon each of
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prompted an inter-circuit split,' which the United States Supreme
Court, rather than the independent United States Sentencing
Commission, was forced to resolve.' Although the Supreme Court
concluded that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that
the defendant be given notice of the sentencing court's sua sponte
decision to depart from the Guideline sentencing range,6' the impact
of the decision directly affects the scheme of Guideline sentencing
which the Commission was charged with formulating. A truly
comprehensive system of sentencing must account for such basic
procedural issues.
II. OFFENSE LEVEL ADJUSTMENTS

A. Role in the Offense
Guideline sections 3B1.1 and 3B1.2 provide for adjustments
to the defendant's base offense level depending on his or her role in
the offense, that is, whether the defendant was some type of leader
or just a minor player. 62 The operative terms of sections 3B1.1 and
the parties." FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(a)
' Compare United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1989) and United States
v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1989).and United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d
1412 (5th Cir. 1989) (all standing for the proposition that the district court must
provide the defendant with notice of its intent to depart sua sponte from the
Guideline sentence range) with United States v. Bums, 893 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (neither the Guidelines nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
advance notice of a sua sponte departure), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
'0 Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
61Id. at 2187 (Rule 32 requires such notice, whether the contemplated departure
is upward or downward).
62 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 provides as follows:
§ 3B1.1. Aggravating Role
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense
level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive, increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an
organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3
levels.
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or
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3B1.2' are not defined." The application notes provide some
factors which "the court should consider."' Among these are the
nature and scope of the defendant's decision making authority, a
claim to a larger share of any criminal proceeds, the recruitment of
other participants, the role in planning the conduct of the offense,
and the amount of control exercised over others.' The notes also
provide that titles such as "boss" and "kingpin" are not dispositive
and that more than one person can qualify as a "leader" or
"organizer.'' 67
The term "minimal participant" is specifically
(b), increase by 2 levels.
Conversely, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 states:
§ 3B1.2. Mitigating Role
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense
level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal
activity, decrease by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal
activity, decrease by 2 levels.
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.
For example, "organizer," "leader," "manager," and "supervisor" are terms
undefined by U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2. Id.
"See Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18125 ("The guidelines... frequently
fail to provide definitions of terms.... ."); United States v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 97

(S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Jackson, Judge Morris E. Lasker ruled that the Guideline
provisions relating to sentence enhancements for cocaine base were
unconstitutionally vague because they failed to define crack. Id. at 101. The absence
of vital definitions has resulted in a sentencing process in which
[diozens of variables, facts and definitions have become the
subject of prolonged, repeated legal wrangling, with months or
years of jail time hanging in the balance as lawyers and judges
hold Talmudic discussions on such matters as what constitutes
"brandishing" a weapon, whether a water pistol is a gun, and
whether a person's role in a crime is "minor," "minimal" or
somewhere in between.
Margolick, supra note 18, at 1.
6s See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.3). Each of the Guidelines is followed by
a Commentary provided by the Commission. Within some of the Guideline
Commentaries are Application Notes or Background information. See, e.g., U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7 explains the significance of the Commentary this way:
"Failure to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the
guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal." The
Commentary is therefore an important consideration in the application of the
Guidelines. See also United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991).
"U.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.3).
67 Id.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

366

[Vol. IX

"intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least
culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group."'
The Guideline application notes, together with their
background commentary, suggest that the combined intention of
these two '!role in the offense" guidelines is to assess relative levels
of culpability to perpetrators of a crime involving more than one
actor.69 The application note relating to the downward adjustment
for a minimal participant clearly states that the adjustment is
expected to be used infrequently." No such suggestion appears in
the application notes for the section 3B1.1 upward adjustments.'
The Guideline drafters apparently believed that defendants ordinarily
should not benefit because others played a proportionately higher
role in the crime. In the interests of uniformity and proportionality,
it is difficult to understand why this concept does not apply equally
to the offense level increases for aggravating roles.' Additionally,
the latent ambiguity of the two Guidelines themselves, independent
of their undefined terms, poses serious questions as to their
application and thus undermines their uniformity.' For example,

6

69

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1).

See U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2 and accompanying commentary.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added) provides:
It is intended that the downward adjustment for a minimal
participant will be used infrequently. It would be appropriate, for
example, for someone who played no other role in a very large
drug smuggling operation than to off-load part of a single
marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was
recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction
involving a small amount of drugs.
A proposed amendment to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 would further curtail the availability
of the deduction. The revised commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 would, if adopted,
deny the deduction to those defendants who "received a lower offense level by
virtue of being convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by
his actual criminal conduct.... " Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 90, 99-100 (1992). Since approximately 90% of federal
criminal cases result in guilty pleas, see infra note 115, consider whether the
proposed amendment would reduce the Guideline itself to a practical nullity. In
any case, an assessment of the defendant's role in the offense should not be made
to depend on the plea offer, the terms of which rest solely in the hands of the
prosecutor. See also infra note 109 (detailing the shift of sentencing discretion from
judge to prosecutor).
n See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.
n See Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18123.
73id.
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is the defendant's status in the crime judged against other
participants or to an average standard?74 Does every crime
involving more than one person have a "supervisor" or "manager?"
If one person is designated as the leader, must others be designated
as minor participants? Many appellate opinions do not resolve these
issues, but instead refuse to review a district court's determination of
the defendant's leadership role because it is an "essentially factual"
decision.' The determination of organizer, manager, or supervisor
will not be disturbed unless "clearly erroneous."'
Appellate decisions which address these Guidelines do little
to clarify the ambiguities, and sometimes only add to the debate. A
Second Circuit opinion negatively defined the issue of what
constitutes the conduct of a manager or supervisor.'
The district
court applied the section 3B1.1(b) adjustment to a defendant
convicted of credit extortion based on the following circumstantial
findings: first, in response to the complaints of a customer who could
not repay his debts, the defendant responded, "[Ylou know how
many times I hear this."'
Second, audio tapes showed the
defendant dividing money, designating some as "yours" and some as
belonging to "the other guys." 9 Third, trial evidence revealed that
defendant received orders from "Danbury" or "New York."'
Fourth, defendant visited a convict in a federal prison who ran a
bookmaking business.' The appellate court found that while this
evidence amply supported the proposition that the defendant was
engaged in a criminal enterprise, it was not probative of the
contention that he played any leadership role in the offense.82
, United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1990) (question left
unresolved because moot). See also United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541,
557-58 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir.
1989) (comparing conduct among group members).
7 United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924

(1989).
76Mejia-Orosco, 867

F.2d at 221.
United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947

(1990)..
Id. at 1293.
Id.
8 Id.
7

9

81 Id.

2Id.
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Conversely, United States v. Diaz-Villafanes is an example in
which an appellate court found that the application of a section 3B1.1
upward adjustment was "altogether supportable."' 4 In DiazVillafane, the defendant boasted of "controlling the area,"' s was
protected by groups of individuals (including youths) on bikes,
motorcycles, and in cars,' and had minors deliver the drugs.'
These findings, among others, supported the district court's
characterization of Diaz-Villafane as a leader and the adjustment was,
therefore, affirmed.'
Reviewing courts have also struggled with the meaning of the
term "participant" with reference to "manager, organizer, or
supervisor" increases."' In United States v. DeCicco,9° the defendant

challenged the increase as applied to him, arguing that the fraud of
which he was convicted was perpetrated on unknowing, innocent
victims and thus he was the only "participant" in the criminal activity
and could not be held to have played a leadership role.91 The
Seventh Circuit agreed with the defendant after extensive analysis of
the Guidelines and their application notes.'
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion regarding
this issue in United States v. Anderson." The court there ruled that
"[1]ack of knowledge of appellant's act of robbery should be of no
significance to a determination that appellant was a leader under
Section 3B1.1(c). The intent and conduct of appellant must be the
object of scrutiny."" In this area, the goal of uniformity has clearly
83

874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).

'Id.

at 49.

Id. at 48.
I'
"Id.
87 Id.
Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 48.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
90 899 F.2d 1531 (7th Cir. 1990).
" Id. The court held that this question was one of law and was thus reviewable
de novo. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), (f) (1988).
9 DeCicco, 899 F.2d at 1534-37.
895 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on reh'g, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning for the reversal is discussed infra note 94.
"Anderson, 895 F.2d at 646. This view also finds support in United States v.
Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1989) ("managerial status may attach by
the orchestration of unwitting or duped participants, as well as through the
leadership of criminally responsible participants"). The Ninth Circuit, en banc,
reversed the decision of the Anderson panel because it concluded that the panel had
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not been achieved.' Because the Guideline provisions relating to
the defendant's role in the offense do not adequately specify the
factors integral to this determination, and because essential terms are
left undefined, the sentencing court is left in virtually the same
position it would have been absent a Guideline. The sentencing
court, because of the Guidelines' deficiencies, must assess the
defendant's culpability based on its own appraisal of factors the
Commission did not address. Had the Commission met its assigned
task, district judges would be implementing a detached, impartial
sentencing scheme rather than ones of their own design.
The application of the section 3B1.2 deductions for a
mitigating role is similarly vague. For instance, a seaman who was
paid to store cocaine in his locker as part of a large smuggling
operation was held not to be entitled to the minimal participant
reduction.'
The district court noted that "[t]he person who
transports drugs is not a minimal or minor participant. The person
who transports drugs is a necessary link in the introduction of drugs
into the United States. The transporter is a business partner fronting
incorrectly concluded that the Commentary following U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 was akin to
its legislative history in that it need not be considered unless the meaning of the
Guideline itself was unclear. Anderson, 942 F.2d at 608-14. The Commentary
clearly resolves this question in favor of Anderson in that it provides that a
participant must be "a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of
the offense .... " U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1).

The Ninth Circuit then

embarked on a lengthy discussion on the proper weight to be accorded to the
Commentary, finding that the Commentary lies somewhere between a Guideline
section itself and its legislative history. Anderson, 942 F.2d at 608-14.
" The Commission has proposed to amend the application notes to U.S.S.G. §
3B1.1 to clarify the status of an unwitting participant. It would be difficult to
criticize a court which has trouble applying the proposed amendment:
Application Notes:
1.
A "participant" is a person who is criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have
been convicted. [A person who is not criminally responsible for
the commission of the offense (e.g., an undercover law
enforcement officer) is not a participant.]
In addition, for the purposes of this guideline, a participant
ordinarilyincludes any person who plays the role of a participant,even
ifsuch person is not actually criminally responsiblefor the offense..
Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 90, 100
(1992) (brackets in original).
" United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d. 437 (1st Cir. 1989).
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for the business at the critical time of importation."' It is difficult
to understand exactly what this reasoning has to do with the
defendant's participation in the smuggling operation as compared to
the conduct of others." It instead appears to reflect a policy
consideration concerning drug smuggling as a crime, and thus
ignores a determination of the gravity of the defendant's conduct.
Similarly, the minor participant deduction was not applied to a
defendant who directed a heroin buyer to an appropriate seller, even
though the defendant neither handled drugs nor money himself."
The court's language here tracked the language seen in Wright: °
We believe that a 'steerer' cannot be considered a
'minimal participant' in the rather typical heroin
distribution scheme involved here. 'Steerers' play an
important role in street-level drug transactions,
directing buyers to sellers in circumstances in which
the sellers attempt to conceal themselves from casual
observation. Without 'steerers,' buyers would either
find it difficult to locate sellers or sellers would have
to risk exposure to public view.'"'
Apparently, even if one of two defendants is found to have
Id. at 443.

Narcotic related offenses constitute the primary charge in

approximately half of the cases involving Guideline sentencing. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP.,
supra note 5, at 110 (Figure 13).
" The determination of minor or minimal participant status "turns upon
culpability, not courier status." United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998
(1989).
1 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
o Colon, 884 F.2d at 1552. Although the defendant lost his bid to be considered
a minimal participant, he argued in the alternative that he was entitled to a minor
participant deduction. The court, interestingly, declined to address this issue and
instead relied on the, district judge's opinion that the defendant would have
received an identical sentence even if the minor participant deduction had been
applied because of the Guidelines' overlapping sentence ranges. For a discussion
of overlapping sentence ranges, see United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925 (2d
Cir. 1988). The court's repeated use of the term "steerer" is also noteworthy in light
of the often invoked view that titles and similar characterizations are not
controlling. See, e.g., Buenrostro, 868 F.2d at 138; United States v. White, 875 F.2d
427, 434 (4th Cir. 1989).
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"provided the energy and drive to get the caper moving,''1°2 the

other defendant is not entitled to a minor participant deduction, even
though he "neither thought up the scheme nor played the most active
role."" Furthermore, a defendant who set up a sale of cocaine
between two people, but who did not himself participate in the sale,
was found not to qualify as a minor participant, even though the
government requested that he be treated as such.'04
The section 3B1.2 deductions are seemingly neutralized when
the offense charged is one of attempt or conspiracy.1°5 In United
States v. Anders,"° the defendant alleged that she deserved the
reduction based on her lack of knowledge or understanding of the
scope or structure of the enterprise."°7 While the court rejected this
contention as factually insupportable," it went on to say that "even
if [defendant] did not know the entire scope of the conspiracy, by the
very definition of the offense, she was subject to it."1"
'o

United States v. Tholl, 895 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1990).

103 id.

104 United States v. Richardson, 880 F.2d 376 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968

(1989).
" 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) provides: "[any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any [drug related] offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was
the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
1-06899 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 532 (1991).
'07 Id. at 580.
" The court noted that defendant's evidence "fails to conclusively show" that
she was entitled to the reduction. Id. Compare this burden with the preponderance
standard discussed supra notes 25-35.
1 6
" Anders, 899 F.2d at 591. This proposition allows the government a wide
latitude of discretion. In a large conspiracy, it may deny the § 3B1.2 deductions to
a defendant simply by charging him/her with the conspiracy instead of with any
substantive offense. This construction is also at odds with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3,
comment. (n.1), which states that for a conviction for conspiracy, the defendant is
only accountable for "conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to
or was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." See also United States v. Warters,
885 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1989) (relating to misprision of conspiracy conviction). The
Guidelines have been particularly criticized for simply shifting sentencing
discretion from the judge to the prosecutor. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's
First Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1987-88)
(prosecutorial discretion generally); The Next Page in Federal Sentencing, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1989, at 19 (summarizing the forum appearing in the
February/March 1989 issue of the FED. SENTENCING REP.) (United States District
Judge Harold Greene (D.D.C.) endorsing this view) [hereinafter The Next Page in
Federal Sentencing]; Cabranes, supra note 2, at 2 ("[The Guidelines have sub silentio
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It is difficult to understand how the guidelines relating to the
defendant's role in the offense can be expected to promote sentencing
uniformity. The essential terms are left undefined and their
application by sentencing and appellate courts reflect, more of a
desire to punish strictly participants in drug schemes than a
willingness to consider each defendant according to his or her
culpability. Even the most casual of observations will reveal a
tendency for sentencing judges to be more than willing to enhance
a defendant's sentence."10
Enigmatic guidelines allow these
seemingly harsh results. Defendants' efforts at relief, either through
a reversal of a sentence increase or through appeal from a denial of
a sentence decrease, are consistently stifled because of the limited
appellate review of a Guideline sentence. Resting these decisions in
the hands of the hundreds of United States District Judges, fused
with opportunities for prosecutorial discretion relating to sentencing
disposition, is an ill-advised method through which to achieve
sentencing uniformity."'
moved the locus of discretion from the judge to the prosecutor."); Stanley S. Arkin,
Prosecutorial Power and Sentencing Problem, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1991, at 3 ("jTMhe
guidelines have only served to magnify the already uneven influence of the
prosecutor's office and give it yet more power. This is so particularly in preindictment negotiations, where, for example, downward departure for cooperation
may overwhelm possible acquittal as the far less risky course."). But see Terrance
G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 719-20 (1990)
(Guidelines will reduce prosecutorial misuse of RICO statutes).
110See United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1991). In Torres, the Third
Circuit upheld the district judge's decision to consider, in determining the
Guideline base offense level, drugs which were suppressed at trial. Id. at 325 ("The
desirability of reaching an appropriate decision in sentencing outweighs what little
deterrent effect may be present [by invoking the exclusionary rule]"). The Torres
court stated that the suppressed drugs were evidence of probative relevant conduct
of the sort delineated in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, entitled "Relevant Conduct (Factors that
Determine the Guideline Range)." Torres, 926 F.2d at 324. The Torres rationale has
been adopted consistently by other circuits. See United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d
1226, 1234-36 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 885 (1992); United States v.
McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 67-69 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 885 (1992);
Deborah Pines, Tainted Evidence Ordered Consideredfor Sentencing, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25,
1992, at I (summarizing United States v. Tejada, No. 91-1071 (2d Cir. 1992)). For
a forthright overview of the importance of relevant conduct to Guideline
sentencing, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1990).
" "[D]isparity [in sentencing] is not only alive and well [under the Guideline
system of sentencing], it is now probably more common than before ..
Cabranes, supra note 2, at 2.
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B. Acceptance of Responsibility
Guideline section 3E1.1 provides for an offense level
deduction if the defendant accepts responsibility for his or her
conduct in the offense." 2 The text of the Guideline is followed by
a non-exhaustive list of factors which the Commission concluded
were relevant in the evaluation of this issue."' This Guideline has
generated a wide variety of appellate opinions delineating the scope
of the adjustment, almost always in a narrow, fact-specific context.
Several definite patterns have nonetheless emerged. For example,
self-serving statements of guilt apparently designed to invoke the
provision are not received well." 4 Similarly, courts reject outright
the proposition that a guilty plea itself automatically entitles the
defendant to the reduction.1 Courts have also steadily refused to
112 U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1 provides as follows:

§ 3E1.1. Acceptance of Responsibility
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates'a recognition and
affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal
conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this section
without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty
plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practical
certainty of conviction at trial.
(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a
sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.
113See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1). Even when a defendant's conduct
corresponded with every example in the list of conduct that the Commission
identified as reflecting acceptance of responsibility, he was still denied the
deduction because "he never accepted responsibility for his criminal actions."
United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 610 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861

(1989).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1990) (calculated
simulations of remorse do not qualify as acceptance of responsibility); United States
v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1036 (1990); United
States v. Moskowitz, 883 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1078 (1991)
(defendant's conclusory statement in affidavit that "I accept responsibility for my
conduct" justified skepticism).
11 It is difficult to see why a defendant would press this issue, clearly resolved
by subsection (c) of the Guideline and reiterated by comment. (n.2), which provides
that a guilty plea may offer some evidence of acceptance of responsibility but is not
in and of itself dispositive. Nonetheless, defendants have advanced this argument,
albeit unsuccessfully. See, e.g., United States v. Guarin, 898 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.
1990); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285,292 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Tellez, 882 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1989). The Guidelines do not appear to have
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apply the deduction to career offenders, even those who have
obviously accepted responsibility for their conduct." 6
Beyond these accepted constructions, the findings of the
district court are dispositive and largely insulated from review in this
area. 17 Thus, a defendant's refusal to surrender to authorities
following an escape from custody was a proper predicate for denial
of the deduction."'
Further, a defendant's post-plea, pre-sentence conduct is
relevant to the acceptance of responsibility issue. A defendant who
continued to sell drugs while awaiting sentence was properly denied
the deduction." 9 The defendant's refusal to name the person who
hired him or the amount he was paid to smuggle drugs was also a
proper basis for denial of the deduction. 20 Also relevant is the fact
that the defendant did not voluntarily terminate his involvement in
the criminal activity. 21 Other factors generally considered for
122
purposes of a deduction include the failure to make restitution,
refusing to assist law enforcement officials," not apologizing to the
victims, 24 and the defendant's denial of his identity to arresting
altered the frequency by which defendants plead guilty as opposed to those who
go to trial. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 48 (Table I) (90.3% of pre-Guideline
cases resulted in guilty pleas, 87.7% of Guideline cases were similarly resolved).
116See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Huff, 873 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495 (1st Cir.
1989). The Guidelines were subsequently amended to allow such a deduction.
U.S.S.G. App. C at 109 (amendment 266 relating to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1).
"' While the sentencing court's findings on most issues are reviewed under a
"due deference" standard, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988), for purposes of this
Guideline, "the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference
on review." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5) (emphasis added).
118 United States v. Lucas, 889 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1989).
119 United States v. Wivel, 893 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1990) (pre-sentence conduct
evincing a lack of acceptance of responsibility for the underlying crime); United
States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1989).
121 United States v. Tellez, 882 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1989).
"' United States v. Luster, 889 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lucas,
889 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1989).
" Lucas, 889 F.2d at 699.
123id.
124

Id.
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officers.'25 The sentencing court may not, however, insist that the
defendant make an inculpatory statement concerning
charges which
126
are to be dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Conversely, payment of restitution to victims has been held
to be an important factor in evaluating whether a defendant actually
accepts responsibility for the offense. 27
Positive post-arrest
conduct such as undergoing drug treatment and participating in the
counseling of other substance abusers is further evidence of
Luster, 889 F.2d at 1526. Denial of one's identity, while a proper basis for
denying the U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 reduction, is not itself a proper predicate for invoking
a U.S.S.G § 3C1.1 enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(a)); see also
infra note 143.
" United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989) (such insistence by
court held violative of Fifth Amendment). But see United States v. Braxton, 903
F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991). In Braxton, the defendant
pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Before sentencing, Braxton explained the
factual circumstances underlying his conviction. Braxton, 903 F.2d at 297. The
district court concluded from his allocution that his conduct constituted attempted
murder as a matter of law and used attempted murder (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1) as the
base offense level for sentencing purposes even though the conviction was for
aggravated assault. Id. For purposes of determining the applicable base offense
level, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) [emphasis added] provides that "[iun the case of conviction
by a plea of guilty... containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more
serious offense than the offense of conviction, determine the offense guideline
section... most applicable to the stipulated offense." The district court and the
Fourth Circuit both concluded that the word "stipulation" as contemplated by
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) included the defendant's recitation of facts and that the
Guideline did not require that the stipulation be part of a quid pro quo type of plea
agreement. Id. at 298. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Braxton v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991). The unanimous opinion, authored by Justice
Scalia, is perhaps indicative of future Supreme Court review of Guideline
sentencing. Following the Court's grant of certiorari, the Commission requested
public comment on whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) should be amended to require that
such a stipulation be part of a formal plea agreement. Braxton, 111 S. Ct. at 1857.
The Court thereafter declined to address the issue of whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a)
as it existed at the time of Braxton's plea required that the stipulation be part of a
formal plea agreement, thereby demonstrating extraordinary deference to the
Commission's authority to dictate sentencing policy: "We choose not to resolve [this
issue], because the Commission has already undertaken a proceeding that will
eliminate circuit conflict over the meaning of § 1B1.2...
." Id. at 1858. Instead, the
Court resolved the case by ruling that even if U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) allowed
consideration of Braxton's allocution, his statements did not "specifically establish"
the more serious offense because of culpability issues. Id. at 1158-59.
"z United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127
(1990); United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990).
12
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acceptance of responsibility."2
While this deduction is seemingly applied in the fashion for
which it was intended, this result arises due not to objective
applications of a comprehensive guideline, but rather because
sentencing judges have filled the dormant loopholes of the provision
according to their own vision of how the Guideline should function.
Here again is an example of the judiciary performing the work of the
Commission. Had the Commission been more careful to spell out
some of the countless examples it should have envisioned would
affect this Guideline, this result need not have been the case.
Uniformity cannot be achieved by individual sentencing judges each
making policy decisions prompted by nebulous guidelines.
C. Obstruction of Justice
Guideline section 3C1.1, 2 which deals with obstruction of
proceedings, is an inverse companion of sorts with section 3E1.1.1'
The imposition of an offense level increase pursuant to this Guideline
usually precludes a section 3E1.1 decrease for acceptance of
responsibility, though not always.3
The application notes
following this Guideline provide some examples of the types of
conduct which would trigger this adjustment. 32 Among the types
of conduct leading to the increase are the destruction or concealment
of material evidence or directing another to do so.133 By judicial
interpretation, this category also encompasses a defendant who
throws narcotics out of a car window. 3 ' Another application note
allows the increase for a defendant who suborns untruthful
testimony or otherwise produces false, forged, or counterfeit
1

United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112

(1990).
129U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 reads: "Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of

Justice. If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct
or impede the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels."
130 See supra note 112.
's'

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4).
§ 3C1.1, comment. (n.1) (examples including destroying

132 See U.S.S.G.

evidence, threatening a witness or juror, and producing altered or forged
documents).
133U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(d)).
13 United States v. Galvan-Garcia, 872 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
857 (1989).
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testimony or documentation in reference to a judicial proceeding.' s
This sort of increase was applied to a father when "it [was]
reasonable to infer"''" that he had led his son to commit
pejury. 1 It was also applied to a defendant who lied about his
drug use to his probation officer. 3' In order to invoke this
increase, it is not necessary that the obstructive conduct occur after
the offense; as evidenced by the example pertaining to throwing
drugs from a car,'39 obstructive conduct occurring during the
commission of the underlying offense is equally applicable."4
Although not part of the application notes, courts have
applied this increase on the basis of flight from law enforcement
officers."" Reviewing courts have rejected the proposition that the
Guideline is intended to cover only those actions which have a
material effect on the government's investigative efforts,'4 instead
espousing the notion that the loss of time, manpower, and money
incurred by a defendant's conduct is sufficient to invoke the
increase." One circuit court reasoned one step further, concluding
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(c)).
sUnited States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 1989). It is unclear
whether this standard comports to the preponderance standard discussed supra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
" McDowell, 888 F.2d at 292.
'- United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1989). The court concluded
that this misrepresentation was a "material fact" as mandated by U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.l(c)). Jordan,890 F.2d at 973. The Commission subsequently amended
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to reflect that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Guideline
in Jordan was erroneous. See U.S.S.G. App. C at 163-66 (amendment 347 relating
to U.S.S.G. § 30.1). See also United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 134748
(7th Cir. 1991) (applying the revised U.S.S.G. § 31.1).
1 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
'4 United States v. Cain, 881 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1989).
141 United States v. Tellez, 882 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[defendant's]
attempted flight, which endangered not only the life of the arresting officer but the
lives of innocent bystanders... provides] adequate support for the trial court's
finding of obstruction"). The Commission has enacted a new guideline designed
specifically to address flight. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 ("Reckless Endangerment During
Flight") (effective Nov. 1, 1990).
'
But see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
14 United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
932 (1989) (defendant provided federal officers with a false name). The Brett
opinion as to this issue has apparently been overruled by the revised U.S.S.G. §
31.1, comment. (nn.3(g), 4(a)), which, read together, impose a requirement that the
false information cause an actual and significant hinderance to the investigation.
"
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that it was unnecessary to prove any loss of time, money, or
manpower since attempted obstruction is punished in the same
manner as actual obstruction.1 "
Another court, apparently
ignoring 'section 3C1.1's "attempt" language, reached the opposite
conclusion.14
Different courts; different sentencing practices. The case law
anecdotes related above are instances of conduct the Commission
should have anticipated. Consequently, the Commission should have
explicitly addressed issues such as the necessity of a "material"
obstruction, within the Guideline itself. Absent such provisions, an
individual Guideline is reduced to its interpretation by the
sentencing judge. Of course, individual judges may interpret
identical provisions in dissimilar fashions. It is precisely this type of
sentencing disparity the Guidelines were designed to eliminate. The
Guidelines' ambiguity does not reflect this Congressional vision.
D. Weapons Possession During Narcotics Offense
Section 2D1.i(b)(1) provides *for a 2 level increase for
possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) during the
'"United States v. Patterson, 890 F.2d 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1989).
" United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309, 319 (8th Cir.) [hereinafter Blackman
1] (because defendant's "use of an alias did not have a material bearing on the
government's investigative efforts, we reverse the district court's decision to grant
a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice...."), rev'd on reh'g, 904 F.2d 1250,
1259 (8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Blackman In. The procedural history of Blackman
is particularly odd. In Blackman 1, the Eighth Circuit held, apparently as a matter
of law, that a defendant who provides authorities with a false name when the
authorities are already aware of his true name cannot receive the 2 level U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1 enhancement. Blackman 1, 897 F.2d at 319. For some reason, however, the
case was remanded for a determination of whether the defendant's use of the alias
"constituted a material falsehood which [would qualify] him for an enhanced
sentence under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. It is difficult to
comprehend why this issue was addressed at all in light of the Eighth Circuit's
seemingly conclusive resolution of the question in United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d
1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir.), cer't. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). See supra note 143.
Nevertheless, before the defendant could be resentenced, the Eighth Circuit
reversed itself upon rehearing, possibly due to the intervening amendments to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 discussed supra note'143. Blackman II, 904 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1990).
Curiously, although the case was' decided by the same panel which decided
Blackman I, compare Blackman 1, 897 F.2d at 311 with Blackman II, 904 F.2d at 1252,
the Blackman II opinion makes absolutely no mention of the Blackman I opinion or
the reason for the court's abrupt change in philosophy concerning the application
of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. See Blackman II, 904 F.2d at 1258-60.
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commission of any of the drug related crimes designated in the body
of the Guideline."4 Application note'3 to this Guideline illustrates
that "the adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present,
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the
defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle
in the closet."147 The text of the enhancement provision itself
mentions only "possession," while the application note allows for the
enhancement if the weapon "is present."" Although the Guideline
language makes no reference to constructive possession of the
weapon, the increase has been applied as such."' One court held
that it was unnecessary for purposes of the enhancement that the
government prove a connection between the weapon and the
offense."5 Another circuit, however, reversed the district court's
invocation of the increase because there had been no "showing" that.
the weapon and the narcotics were ever in close enough proximity
to be connected with the offense.15 Contentions that the provision,
16 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 entitled "Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting,

or' Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses)."
"Dangerous weapon" and "firearm" are defined in U.S.S.G. § B1.1, comment. (n.7).
147U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3) (emphasis added). Compare whether the
"unless clearly improbable" standard comports with the preponderance standard
discussed supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
149United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989). The court found
that "the weapon was present" and "it was not improbable that the weapon was
connected to the offense." Id.
10 United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1989). The defendant's
home was searched following a cocaine sale and a loaded automatic pistol was
found hidden between the mattress and box spring of the defendant's bed. Id. at
1296. It is difficult to see how the facts here differ in any significant way with
those of the example found in the application note described supra note 147 and
accompanying text. Restrepo cites as authority United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220
(9th Cir. 1989), where the enhancement was applied because the weapon was found
in the same closet as the drugs. The adjustment was even applied to a defendant
who was licensed to carry the firearm, but who did not use or even display the
weapon during the course of the crime. United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284,
1292 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
151United States v. Vasquez, 874 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1989). In Vasquez, the
defendant purchased cocaine from an undercover agent in a parking lot. No
weapon was present on his person. A subsequent search of his home revealed a
revolver located in defendant's bedroom on a night table. Also in the defendant's
apartment were drug paraphernalia and cash. Id. at 251. The Vasquez opinion
differentiates the facts of that case with those of United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d
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read together with its commentary, creates an impermissible burden
on defendants to show that there is no connection between the
weapon and the offense have been rejected."5 2 Similarly, district
courts have balked at the argument that the provision creates a
dilemma for defendants facing both firearm and narcotics counts:
either plead guilty to possession of the firearm or, if acquitted, still
face the enhancement for possession during the drug offense." '
E. The Chapman Dilemma
In Chapman v. United States,"5 ' the Supreme Court upheld

the constitutionality of Guideline section 2D1.1(c), which requires
that the base offense level for distribution of LSD be calculated based
upon the weight of the "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount" of LSD." The defendant challenged the constitutionality
of the Guideline and the accompanying statute'56 on vagueness,
due process, and equal protection grounds.5 7 LSD is dissolved in
a liquid solvent, such as alcohol, and is then sprayed onto a medium,
such as a piece of blotter paper, a sugar cube, or a gelatin capsule,
upon which the LSD solution evaporates."5 The LSD is then
consumed by the user by ingesting the medium.159 The Court
agreed with both the district court and the Seventh Circuit that the
Guideline requires, for purposes of calculating the base offense level,
that the weight of the LSD include the medium through which the
1412 (5th Cir. 1989), a case cited as authority in Restrepo, 884 F.2d at 1296. In Otero,

the defendant sold cocaine to undercover agents from his hotel room. The agents
found a handgun and ammunition in defendant's van parked outside. The court
concluded that defendant had possessed the firearm during the trip to the hotel
room and that this possession constructively continued through the sale in the hotel
room. Otero, 868 F.2d at 1415.
'"' See Restrepo, 884 F.2d at 12%. The Restrepo court inexplicably deduced that
"[t]he Commentary, therefore, creates an exception to the terms of the Guideline,
not a presumption that a connection existed." Id. The conceptual difference
between these two concepts, if indeed there is a difference, is an arduous one.
153 United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13,17 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Such enhancement
is not a double jeopardy situation.").
's' 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).

See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (emphasis added).

'

156 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988).
7 Chapman, 111
158 Id.

159

Id.

S. Ct. at 1923.
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LSD is transmitted."6 The petitioner's brief included a table which
displayed the great variation of sentences defendants face for
distributing identical dosages of LSD as a function of the
medium.1 6' For example, 100 doses of LSD carried on sugar cubes
weigh 227 grams, producing a base offense level of thirty-six and a
Guideline sentence range of 188-235 months. 62 By contrast, 100
doses of LSD carried in gelatin capsules weigh 225 milligrams,
producing a base offense level of eighteen and a Guideline sentence
range of only 27-33 months."
The Court upheld both the statute and the Guideline as
supported by a rational basis, finding that
[bly measuring the quantity of the drugs according to
the 'street weight' of the drugs in the diluted form in
which they are sold, rather than according to the net
weight of the active component, the statute and the
Sentencing Guidelines increase the penalty for
persons who possess large quantities of drugs,
regardless of their6 purity. That is a rational
sentencing scheme.
The majority similarly rejected the petitioner's void for vagueness
and due process challenges."6 Justice Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, took the majority to task:
The consequences of the majority's construction of 21
U.S.C. § 841 [and the Guidelines] are so bizarre that
I cannot believe they were intended by Congress.
Neither the ambiguous language of the statute, nor its
sparse legislative history, supports the interpretation
reached by the majority today. Indeed, the majority's
construction of the statute will necessarily produce
sentences that are so anomalous that they will
"0 Id. at 1925.
161Id. at 1924 n.2 (citing Brief for Petitioners, Chapman v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 1919 (1990) (No. 90-5744)) (one dose of pure LSD, exclusive of the medium,
weighs approximately .05 mg).
162

Id.

163

Id.

1"Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1927-28.
"s Id. at 1929.
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undermine the very uniformity that Congress sought
to achieve when it adopted the Sentencing
Guidelines.'"
The Chapman opinion has not been applied uniformly. For
example, the First Circuit has interpreted Chapman to allow a
sentencing court to include in the calculation of the base offense level
the weight of a fiberglass suitcase containing cocaine. 67 On the
other hand, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing a case in
which the district court calculated the base offense level to include
both a distinct quantity of usable methamphetamine as well as
unusable by-products resulting from its chemical synthesis."6 The
Sixth Circuit ruled that Chapman rested on the assumption that only
those substances which increase the usable amount of the drug for
sale may be calculated into the base offense level. 69 The case was
therefore remanded to allow, the defendant to adduce evidence
concerning the usability of the narcotic by-products. 7 ° The
Eleventh Circuit has also employed the "usability" test in following
Chapman.'
The contrast between these post-Chapman cases is
indicative of the inevitable results of ill-defined Guideline terms. :
The difficulty in applying these offense level adjustment
provisions is due to a combination of poor drafting"' 2 and the
judicial realization that weapons have become "tools of the trade" in
illegal narcotics activities.' 7' This combination, lethal in terms of
sentencing for narcotics defendants, does not treat necessarily
dissimilar cases differently in furtherance of the congressional
mandate of proportionality. A large scale drug dealer with an Uzi
on his person is treated identically to a small time hood who
arranges a deal between two strangers and who has a firearm in his
Id. at 1929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
United States v. Lopez-Gil, No. 90-2059, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 330 (1st Cir.
Jan. 3, 1992). A scholar regarded this case as a "rather powerful example of a
world gone insane." Margolick, supra note 18, at 40 (quoting Marc Miller of Emory
166
167

Law School).
168

United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 135-37 (6th Cir. 1991).
137.

1' Id. at
170 id.
171See
'n
"

United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1991).
See Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18125.
United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.

1042 (1988) (pre-Guidelines).
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closet miles away from a transaction in which he did not even
directly participate. The Commission is, as are district court judges,
plainly convinced that, at least in the contemptible world of drug
dealers, proportionality must yield to uniformity.
III. THE

CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE

A. Computing the Criminal History Score
Guideline sections 4A1.1 - 4A1.2 set out themethodology to
be used in the computation of the criminal history category, which
forms the horizontal axis of the sentencing table.174 Section
4A1.2(a)(1) defines a prior sentence.17 Judicial interpretation has
construed this provision also to include those convictions in which
an appeal is still pending.76 Section 4A1.2(c)(2) limits the
definition of a prior sentence and excludes juvenile ,status
offenses."r Despite this restriction, United States v. Kirby1" held
that where state law provided that the defendant's adjudication as a
delinquent did not constitute a conviction, the defendant's prior
sentence still qualified 1 as an adjudication of guilt for sentence
enhancement purposes. 7
174U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 details the formula to be followed. For example, each
previous conviction resulting in imprisonment for more than one year and one
month adds three points to the criminal history score. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2 outlines the relevant definitions and instructions for the criminal history
computation.
175U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1) reads, "(a) Prior Sentence Defined (1) The term 'prior
sentence' means any sentence. previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt,
whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the
instant offense."
176 United States v. Mackbee, 894 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 926
(1990). Mackbee also supports the proposition that a juvenile conviction may be
utilized for sentence enhancement for adult convictions. Id. at 1058. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(d)(2). See also United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990) (rejecting proposition that juvenile convictions may not
be used for adult sentence enhancement because they are rendered in a less
adjudicatory setting).
'- U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) reads as follows: "Sentences for the following prior
offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are never
counted: .... J]uvenile status offenses and truancy [in addition to others] ..
178893 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
1' Id. at 868 ("Federal law, not Kentucky law, controls sentencing disposition
in the event of convictions for federal offenses.") (citations omitted).
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Furthermore, in the computation of the criminal history score,
the Commission failed to define important terms.' 80 For example,
expunged convictions are not counted in the criminal history
score."" However, the term "expunged" is not defined by the
Guidelines. 82 This task, therefore, fell upon sentencing and
appellate courts."
Surely the Commission must have foreseen the necessity to
define pivotal terms as well as the potential for conflicting definitions
of case resolutions between federal and state jurisdictions. As
Congress implied, the Commission is in the best position to evaluate
a coherent sentencing policy.' Lamentably, the Commission failed
to address considerations adequately, such as the status of various
state juvenile proceedings and the sentencing worth of previous
convictions in which an appeal is pending, which are required to
evaluate the defendant's criminal history. It is unfortunate that these
explications of the Guidelines' application come not from the
Guidelines themselves, but from the sentencing decisions of federal
judges, whose discretion the Guidelines were designed to curtail.
B. Departingfrom the Criminal History Score
Chapter Four of the Guidelines deals with the computation
of the defendant's criminal history score, which forms the horizontal
axis of the sentencing table." The Commission, however, believed
that despite its best efforts to capture accurately the defendant's past
criminal conduct in a cohesive fashion, there would arise certain
instances where the criminal history score would yield an inaccurate
result regarding the seriousness of the defendant's past conduct or
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). Note that certain expunged convictions, however, may
be considered in specific instances pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
2 See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 comment. (n.10).
" See United States v. Beaulieau, No. 91-1290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3775 (2d
Cir. Mar. 5, 1992); United States v. Hidalgo, 932 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1991)
(defining 'expunged' by analogizing a provision of the Federal Youth Corrections
Act as explained in Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660 (1983)).
18
11

See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
1 See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A.1-4B1.3.
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the likelihood that the defendant would commit other future
crimes.'" For this reason, the Guidelines specifically allow for
departures from the criminal history score.'87
The departure Guideline goes on to provide a short list of
possible information which might justify such a departure." The
remaining text of the Guideline intimates, but does not actually
mandate, that the sentencing court should adjust the defendant's
criminal history category to the category that the defendant's past
conduct most closely resembles, instead of departing outright from
the Guideline sentence range. 89 Appellate decisions have followed
the Guideline suggestion, and the desired result is now apparently
1s1See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, comment. (backg'd.). Robinson's Dissent found this
conclusion to reflect a major problem with the Guidelines, since ease of departure
conflicts with the mandate of uniformity set out supra note 8 and accompanying
text. Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18125.
's

U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 states:

§ 4A1.3. Adequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy
Statement)
If reliable information indicates that the criminal history category
does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's
past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a
sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline
range.
Departures from the defendant's criminal history score should not be confused with
departures based on offense conduct which are authorized by U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0,
although both types of departures have similar characteristics and produce similar
results. Departures based on inadequacy of the criminal history score represent
41% of all Guideline departures. U.S.S.C. Ann. Rep., supra note 5, at 71 (Table Q).
" For example: prior sentences not represented in the criminal history score,
prior sentences of substantially more than one year, similar misconduct established
by civil adjudication, whether defendant was somehow involved with the judicial
system at the time of the instant offense, or other conduct not resulting in
conviction. U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.3(a)-(e).
's Id. The most appropriate category is usually the next higher one. See United
States v. Kennedy, 893 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1990). "[W]e hold that a sentencing court
must first look to the next higher criminal history category before otherwise
departing from the guidelines." Id. at 829. The Kennedy case was remanded for resentencing for two reasons, one of which was the fact that the district court
"departed beyond the next higher criminal history category without demonstrating
either that it first looked to the next higher criminal history category for guidance
or that it found the sentence under the next higher criminal history category too
lenient." Id.
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a matter of law."9 For defendants already at the maximum
criminal history category (category VI), inadequacy of the criminal
history score may prompt an outright departure pursuant to section
5K2.0.191 As is required for most aspects of sentencing under the
Guidelines, the sentencing court must state its reasons for departure
on the record." Failure to articulate the reasons for the criminal
history departure invariably leads to a remand.'" As contemplated
by the text following section 4A1.3,'

convictions not counted

toward the computation of the criminal history score may provide
Id. See also United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1989). In Miller, the
I9
Seventh Circuit remanded the case for re-sentencing when the district judge,
relying on appropriate factors for a criminal history departure, did not adjust the
defendant's criminal history score to a category more appropriate for his prior
record, but instead relied on his own mathematical formulation for the departure.
In United States v. Fayette, 895 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit
found that the criminal history departure, rather than the general U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0
departure, was the only available option to a sentencing judge when considering
a defendant's post-plea conduct. Cf United States v. Fisher, 868 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 (1989), where the Fifth Circuit affirmed a criminal history
departure upward to the statutory maximum, without regard to an adjustment to
the appropriate criminal history category.
"9 See United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1989). In Joan, the defendant
was assessed a criminal history category of VI. A departure sentence was affirmed
based, in addition to other factors, on the defendant's extensive record which was
not reflected in the category VI score. An outright sentence departure was in order
in this circumstance because the defendant's criminal history above the maximum
level is a circumstance not adequately addressed by any other aspect of the
Guidelines. See infra note 211.
" United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It is necessary
... that the court clearly identify any aggravating factors and specify its reasons
for utilizing a particular criminal history category."). The district court adjusted the
defendant's criminal history category upward from category I to category IV based
on its conclusion that "[tihis is a pretty bad record." Id. at 52 (citing the district
court). The circuit court found that the conclusion was sufficiently "cryptic" so as
to require a remand. Id. at 54.
'93 See United States v. Wells, 878 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1989). In Wells, the district
court adjusted the defendant's criminal history score based on the following record:
"The court concludes that the defendant's criminal history category significantly
underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history, and the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history more closely represents that of
defendants of a category VI criminal history .... " Id. at 1232. The circuit court
found these reasons inadequate to support the departure without an accompanying
recitation of their factual basis. See also United States v. Kennedy, 893 F.2d 825 (6th

Cir. 1990).
" See supra note 187.
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the basis for a departure.19 Furthermore, for departure purposes,
courts may also consider certain convictions specifically discounted
in the criminal history computation.1" Although not addressed by
the Guidelines, a prior acquittal due to insanity has been held to
constitute sufficient basis to depart upward in the criminal history
category.197 Courts may not, however, consider a quality such as
the timing of the offense, which the Second Circuit found would
"elevate form over substance."''
The Guideline also provides that any departure in the
19United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990). The upward departure
in Carey was based on three prior felony convictions (one of which was violent and
gun-related) not counted in the criminal history score because they were more than
fifteen years old and eight uncounted misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 646.
" For example, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2) precludes convictions which are more
than ten years old from being counted towards the defendant's criminal history
score. Such convictions may form the basis for a departure. See, e.g., United States
v. Lopez, 871 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. De Luna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1989). Similarly, although U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 treats two cases
consolidated for trial as one crime for purposes of the criminal history computation,
the sentencing court may count them separately for a criminal history departure.
United States v. Jackson, 883 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1032
(1990). For a discussion of the use of unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions
as a basis for a sentence enhancement, see D. Brian King, Note, Sentence
Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373

(1989).
19 United States v. McKenley, 895 F.2d 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[A]n acquittal
by reason of insanity is reliable information that a district court may consider in
assessing whether a defendant's criminal history category, as computed under the
Guidelines, adequately reflects a defendant's past criminal conduct or his potential
for future criminal behavior.").
'-United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 408-10 (2d Cir. 1989). The Coe case is
interesting both factually and because of its insight into the application of the
Guidelines. The defendant had been released from federal custody on June 6,1988
and was to report to a Federal Halfway House Id. En route, he stopped in Atlantic
City, where he lost almost all of his money. Id. On June 7, when the defendant
failed to report to the Halfway House, the Bureau of Prisons declared him an
escapee. Id. Between June 13 and June 27, the defendant robbed four banks and
stole a car. Id. Following his capture and pursuant to a plea agreement, the
defendant pleaded guilty to one of the robberies and to the escape. Id. at 408. The
district court departed upward from the applicable Guideline range. Id. The
Second Circuit found that a crime-spree pattern of robberies over a short period of
time was not a valid basis for a criminal history departure. Id. at 410. The Second
Circuit did recognize the difference between a § 4A1.3 departure and a § 5K2.0
departure. Id. at 408-414.
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criminal history area must be based on "reliable information."1
Although the term "reliable" is undefined,2" it is clear that, because
it does not provide sufficient indicia of past criminal conduct, a prior
arrest record shall not, in and of itself, be considered.'
The
Seventh Circuit considered the question of what constitutes "reliable
information" in United States v. Miller."°2 In Miller, the sentencing
judge adjusted the defendant's criminal history category from
category I to category III based on certain aspects of the defendant's
conduct which were not reflected in his criminal history score.'
The defendant contended that since these charges were dismissed
without an adjudication of guilt, they could not be considered by the
district court as reliable indicia of culpability for purposes of
computing defendant's criminal history.'
The district court and
the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument.2'°
To rely on dismissed charges in computing a defendant's
criminal history score runs counter to concepts of fundamental
fairness. Our system of criminal justice prides itself on the
unmistakable premise that no one is guilty of a crime unless and
'"See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
o See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See text following U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 ("[a] prior arrest record itself shall not be
considered .... ").

874 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (sentence vacated on other grounds).
Id. at 468. This conduct included three pending state misdemeanor charges
(one involved theft and the other two were bench warrants) and one pending state
felony charge (for burglary). All of these state charges were dismissed after the
defendant pleaded guilty to the federal charges underlying this case. Id. at 468-69.
The sentence was vacated not because of the consideration of unreliable
information, but because of the jump from category I to category III, without first
considering category II. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
Miller, 874 F.2d at 469.
Id. at 469-70 ("There does not have to be a conviction to permit departure.").
The court endorsed the district judge's view that he did not have to try the state
actions in order to determine the defendant's culpability. The fact that the
presentence report was less than crystal clear on the background of the charges
caused the circuit court to note that "[a]lthough it is most unlikely, the local
authorities could have decided that they had the wrong defendant, or for some
other exculpatory reason dismissed the charges." Id. Nonetheless, the state charges
were authorized as reliable information in the consideration of defendant's criminal
history. Id. at 470. But see Judge Challenges Sentencing in Cocaine Case, UPI, Nov. 17,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (United States District Judge
James Turk (W.D. Va.) refusing to enhance a defendant's sentence based on charges
dropped as a result of plea bargain).
20
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until the government proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The Guidelines, however, allow a defendant to be punished based on
a past charge upon which s/he had no opportunity to be heard at all.
The possibility of later punishment based on a wrongful and
unprovable current criminal accusation can only be termed
draconian.
I
One other related concept regarding the criminal history
calculation is also quite interesting. Section 4A1.1(e) provides for a
criminal history enhancement (rather than a basis for a departure) if
the defendant committed the instant offense after having escaped
from custody.' This enhancement has been applied to convictions
under the substantive offense of Escape from Federal Custody, 2
even though the escape was a necessary element of the crime.'
This absurd result 10 supports the hypothesis that the Guidelines do
not fulfill their goal of uniformity. It cannot honestly be believed
that the Commission perceived that such enhancements should be
part of a comprehensive sentencing scheme. It is more plausible that
such incidents are factored into the base offense level. If this
supposition is accurate, the Commission should have stated its view.
If not, the Guidelines must be amended to remedy an obviously
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (explaining the history and
constitutional nature of the reasonable doubt standard).
7U.S.S.G. §§ 4Al.l(d),(e) reads (emphasis added):
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant
offense while under any criminal justice sentence,
including probation, parole, supervised release,
imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
(e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense
less than two years after release from imprisonment on a
sentence counted under (a) or (b) or while in imprisonment or
escape status on such a sentence. If two points are added for
item (d), add only one point for this item.
18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1988).
See United States v. Vickers, 891 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1989). The Vickers court summarily rejected
defendant's contention that the enhancement "amount[ed] to a 'double whammy.'"
Vickers, 891 F.2d at 87. See also United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251 (3d Cir.
1989) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment due process attack).
210 Following this proposition through to its logical extreme, a defendant
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, see U.S.S.G. § 2A1.3, could have his sentence
enhanced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2 (defining 'physical injury' as a permissible
basis for an upward departure) because the victim died during the commission of

the offense.
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ridiculous situation.
IV. OUTRIGHT DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE SENTENCE

A policy statement within the Guidelines explicitly provides
sentencing judges with broad authority to depart from the applicable
Guideline sentence if certain circumstances exist. 1 The inclusion
of Guidelines relating to sentence departures is an acknowledgement
of the inherent limitations of a guideline based system of criminal
sentencing; no system of guidelines could possibly cover every
variable of criminal conduct. Even if possible, such a system of
guidelines would undoubtedly be unworkable. Conceding the
necessity of departure provisions, the issues therefore center on how
best to retain the ability of sentencing courts to depart while not
completely undermining the goal of uniformity.
The Guidelines following the policy statement provide
examples of circumstances which may provide the impetus to
depart.212 In analyzing departures, reviewing courts generally
211The

policy statement found in U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 recites the language of 18

U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988):

Under 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a
sentence outside the range established by the applicable
guideline, if the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines...
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s.
The statement also provides that "the court may depart from the
guidelines, even though the reason for departure is taken into consideration in the
guidelines (e.g., as a specific offense characteristic or other adjustment), if the court
determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to
that factor is inadequate." Compare this statement to the uniformity purposes of
the Guidelines discussed supra note 9 and accompanying text.
212 See U.S.S.G. §§ 51(2.1-51(2.15. These Guidelines, which authorize departures,
are respectively entitled: Death, Physical Injury, Extreme Psychological Injury,
Abduction or Unlawful Restraint, Property Damage or Loss, Weapons and
Dangerous Instrumentalities, Disruption of Governmental Function, Extreme
Conduct, Criminal Purpose, Victim's Conduct, Lesser Harm, Coercion and Duress,
Diminished Capacity, Public Welfare, and Terrorism. Commentators have
wondered why the Commission did not formulate guidelines to deal with these
subjects instead of leaving them to the discretion of the sentencing judge. See, e.g.,
Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18125.
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employ a three step inquiry.213 First, the appellate court analyzes
the circumstances relied on by the sentencing court to determine
whether the circumstances, if they exist, would be unusual enough
to warrant a departure.214 The second step involves determining
whether the circumstances relied upon for the departure existed in
the case at bar.215 The final step reviews the actual departure to
ensure its reasonableness.216
This three step analysis would enjoy added legitimacy had it
been formulated by the Commission and not the judiciary.
Conversely, a sentencing court's decision not to depart from the
calculated Guideline range is not reviewable at all.2"7 Here again,
this result is not the consequence of a policy decision by the
Commission. Rather, it represents the Commission's failure to
address an issue which should have been settled prior to the
implementation of the Guidelines.
A. Upward Departures
1. Valid Bases for Departure. - Cases involving upward departures
from the Guidelines are necessarily fact specific. 218

Defendants

facing narcotics charges have had their Guideline sentences increased
for a variety of reasons. In United States v. Ryan,"9 the defendant's
sentence was increased because the district judge concluded that the
Guidelines did not adequately take into account the volume of drugs,
The three step test is set out in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43,
49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
24 This determination is made as a matter of law. Id. at 49.
21 Id. This question is a factual matter and enjoys the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review set out supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
216 Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49. This question is "quintessentially a judgment
call" and will not be "lightly" disturbed. Id. at 49-50.
217 See, e.g., United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269 (3d. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Draper, 888 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.
1989); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Colon,
884 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989); United States v. Fossett, 881
F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1989). These decisions reflect the absence of a Guideline or a
statute which defines a defendant's appeal in this circumstance. See 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a) (1988).
213

218

219

See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989).
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their purity, or their packaging."2 In a comparable case, United
States v. Anders, 1 the upward departure was affirmed based on the
defendant's past criminal history,'m the amount of drugs involved,
and corroborated information concerning the defendant's drug
trafficking activities.'
Large quantities of drugs and high levels
of purity seem to be overriding considerations. 4 Similarly, the
sentencing court's findings that the defendant was a "more active
cocaine dealer" than his base offense level indicated and that he
depended on cocaine dealing for his livelihood have been held
sufficiently unusual to support a departure.2
Since the Commission could not define the exact
circumstances which should prompt a departure, 226 that task has
been left to the sentencing judges and the appellate courts, guided by
the Guidelines policy statements concerning departures. 7 For
example, the Guidelines do not define precisely the type of
psychological harm that may justify a departure.'
The Sixth
Circuit applied the Guideline to cover a departure caused by a
defendant who forced the victims of a bank robbery to disrobe at
Id. at 605. Ryan possessed more than ten grams of crack with a 90% purity.
The drugs were packaged in 33 individual packages, suggesting they were for
distribution. Id. The Third Circuit affirmed these factors as warranting departure.
Id. at 610. Drug volume was the foundation for 7.1% of upward departures in
1990. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 71 (Table Q).
899 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1990).
'2 Id. at 579.
Neither the district court nor the circuit court apparently
considered raising the defendant's criminal history score as contemplated supra
notes 185-210 and accompanying text.
223 Anders, 899 F.2d at 579.
n See, e.g., United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988) (twenty
kilograms of cocaine with an 87% purity); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d
43, 50-51 (1st Cir.) (defendant characterized as an important supplier with eight
pending trafficking charges, operation netted $10,000-$15,000 daily, and defendant
employed minors), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
' United States v. Guarin, 898 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1990). See also U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.9 relating to departures based on criminal activity for a livelihood.
22 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 states, in part, that "[c]ircumstances that may warrant
departure from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very
nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance."
' See generally Robert G. Morvillo, Upward Mobility Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1991, at 3.
See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. Extreme psychological harm prompted only 1.9% of
upward sentence departures in 1990. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 71 (Table

Q).
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gunpoint in order to facilitate his escape. 9 In an analogous
situation, the Guidelines do not definitively resolve the issue of what
constitutes disruption of governmental functions. 2' A circuit court
opinion rejected a defendant's argument that his offense did not
significantly disrupt government functions because his actions went
undetected for six years and his thefts amounted to only a small
fraction of the government agency's budget."
Additionally, courts have had to grapple with the delineation
of what constitutes conduct so "extreme" so as to warrant
departure.2 2 This departure provision was held to apply to a
defendant who, charged with credit card fraud, placed the dead
body of the card's true owner in a dumpster and ignited it.2 33 A
district court used the provision to depart from the Guideline
sentence of a defendant who repeatedly sexually abused his seven
year old stepdaughter, but the Eighth Circuit ruled that this
particular departure provision was inapplicable to the facts of the
z United States v. Lucas, 889 F.2d 697, 698-99 (6th Cir. 1989) (teller at the bank
testified that the experience made her feel "very dirty," "guilty," and "gross" and
forced her to change jobs and undergo counseling).
2
3' See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7.
' United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[Tihe record
indicates that he diverted government resources and used federal mechanisms to
perpetrate his crime. Such misuse of the government's vendor payment process is
clearly disruptive; it diverts federal resources from legitimate to illegitimate
recipients."), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991). The Supreme Court's
disposition of the Burns case is detailed supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
2" See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 ("Examples of extreme conduct include torture of a
victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation."). None
of these terms are defined. See supra note 64.
3 United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861
(1989). The background of this case is quite interesting. The defendant, a parolee,
moved in with the victim, an eighty-four year old man with health and alcohol
problems, in order to serve as a housekeeper. The victim came home intoxicated
one evening, struck his head on a table, and died. Although the defendant rushed
to assist the victim, he could not find a pulse. Fearful he would be charged with
murder, the defendant put the victim's body in the trunk of the victim's car and
drove around Texas for a few days, using the victim's credit cards for gas, food,
clothing, and lodging. The defendant testified he could not bury the body because
the ground was frozen, so he burned it. When the State of Texas was unsuccessful
in its attempts to indict the defendant for murder, the federal government indicted
him on credit fraud charges. Id. at 599-600.

394

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

case.2
There may also be certain departures based on considerations
the Commission never contemplated.'
For example, a sentence
departure based on the fact that the offense occurred on the high
seas and the victim was the ship's captain was affirmed in United
States v. Avila-Isoca.'
Moreover, a defendant's possession of
counterfeit money while making a false statement concerning
immigration matters was found to be a circumstance unusual enough
to warrant departure. 7 Finally, as previously indicated,' the
fact that the defendant is already in the highest criminal history
category may prompt a departure where the ordinary course of
adjustment would be within the criminal history category itself?239
2. Invalid Bases for Departure. - Most cases in which a departure
sentence is found to be invalid are instances where the sentencing
court formed the basis for the departure upon an aspect of the
Guidelines which the sentencing court found inadequate, but which
the reviewing court later found to be sufficient. For example, the
district court in United States v. Robinson24' departed upwards
because it found that the defendant made use of an intermediary and
possessed a semi-automatic weapon.2"' The Sixth Circuit remanded
the case for reconsideration, noting that the use of an intermediary
was already factored into a Guideline adjustment, and that the
Guidelines have provisions related to firearm possession. 42
United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1990). The Eighth
Circuit instead affirmed the departure based on extreme psychological injury to the
victim pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. See also supra notes 226-27 and accompanying
text.
2

26

See generally U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
888 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2593 (1990).

237United

States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit also

found that this factor "bore a sufficient relationship to the alien smuggling
misconduct to be available for consideration as a basis for departure.. . ."Id. at

686.
2

See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supranotes 192-

239United

93 and accompanying text.

898 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir. 1990).
at 1118-19.
22 Id. at 1118. The court found that since the defendant was already given an
adjustment for being an organizer pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, departure based on
his use of an intermediary was improper. Id. The court further noted that although
24

24' Id.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 precludes consideration of the type of firearm, "the district court
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Similarly, a defendant's actions in concealing his or her identity is
accounted for within the Guidelines, so any departure on this basis
would be improper absent extenuating circumstances. 2'
Socioeconomic factors may not form the basis for the departure.2'
As per the text following section 5K2.0, the grounds for
departure must be relevant to the offense of conviction.24 Thus, a
departure imposed because those who purchased drugs from the
defendant possessed firearms was improper.2' Also improper was
a departure from a defendant's sentence for smuggling illegal aliens
based on the presence of a small amount of marijuana and a firearm
in defendant's residence.247
B. Downward Departures
Downward departures, decreases from the Guideline
sentence, are reviewed in the same manner as upward
departures. 2'
Thus, the offender's socio-economic status, even
combined with the payment of restitution to the victim, may not
form the basis for a departure. 249 But despite section 5H1.10's
admonition that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and sociomay take into account the nature of the firearm, whether it is automatic and
intended to be used in the drug trade." Id. It is unclear how this reasoning is
consistent with § 2K2.1, but the case was remanded for reconsideration nonetheless.
24 United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1989). See also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
discussed supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
24 See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10; see also United States v. Cervantes Lucatero, 889 F.2d
916 (9th Cir. 1989) (improper departure based on conclusion that defendant was
one of a class who "contribute nothing to society but to violate its laws"); United
States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendant, incorrectly given departure
sentence based on consideration of his education and sophistication).
245See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
24 United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1989).
24 United States v. Garcia-Reyes, 877 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1989).
248See supra notes 218-39 and accompanying text. For an insightful look at how
the defense bar can use the downward departure provisions to the defendant's
maximum advantage, see Tony Garoppolo, DownwardDepartures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1991, at 1.
24 See United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990) (the fact that victim
made restitution, was sixty-two years old and in poor health, and the sentencing
judge's conclusion that the offense was an out of character occurrence could not
support a departure). The Seventh Circuit found that the payment of restitution
was adequately covered by the acceptance of responsibility deductions discussed
supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
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economic factors are not relevant in the sentence determination, and
section 5H1.4's statement that physical condition is ordinarily not
relevant, the Second Circuit upheld the sentencing judge's downward
departure premised on the conclusion that the defendant had a
"feminine cast to his face and a softness of features which will make
him prey to the long-term criminals with whom he will be associated
in prison."250 Similarly, a convicted heroin courier had her sentence
reduced from the Guideline sentence range of 27 to 33 months to
time served,
six weeks, based solely on the fact that she was
1
pregnant. 2

Also unavailable for consideration of a downward departure
are acts already contemplated by other aspects of the Guidelines
(unless extremely unusual circumstances exist): payment of
restitution,252 completion of drug treatment and performing inmate
counseling,' existence of a small amount of drugs and the lack of
violence in the underlying offense,'
and the providing of
United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 525 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing the

sentencing opinion of the district judge). The sentencing judge whose departure
was affirmed was Judge Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.) whose overall view of the
Guidelines is summarized infra note 273; see also United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599
(2d Cir. 1990).
2 Edward A. Adams, Sentence Reduced Due to Pregnancy of Defendant, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 1, 4. Judge Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.) found that the Guideline
sentence would force the defendant to be separated from her then unborn child for
more than two years and that the Guideline sentence would most likely cause the
defendant to lose her parental rights under New York law. Judge Weinstein
concluded that these factors, along with the risk of serious injury or death to the
defendant due to a complicated pregnancy, warranted a downward sentence
departure. Id. Contra United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir.), cert
denied, 111 S.Ct. 353 (1990) ("mhe Commission was fully aware that some
convicted female felons are pregnant at the time of sentencing. If it had thought
pregnancy was a sentencing factor to be considered, the Commission would have
said so."). For other examples of Judge Weinstein's opinions concerning the
Guidelines, see supra notes 109, 250 and infra notes 266, 273.
252 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
20 United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112
(1990). These factors fall within the acceptance of responsibility deduction
discussed supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
2 United States v. Hays, 899 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 385
(1990) (applied to a career offender). These factors are adequately addressed in
U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 2D1.5 comment. (n.1) (weapons possession and use of
violence in a criminal enterprise). Hays, 899 F.2d at 520. The defendant's relief for
the absence of these factors lies in not having the enhancements applied. Id.
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substantial assistance to the authorities.'
One other case involving a downward departure should be
noted as illustrative of the reluctance to depart from the Guidelines.
In United States v. Brewer,' the defendants were convicted of
embezzlement of funds from the bank in which they were employed.
The defendants had made full restitution to the bank before they
were even indicted. 7 The district judge noted eight factors which
he believed justified a downward sentence departure.' The Sixth
Circuit, however, rejected each of these factors, both individually and
cumulatively, as a proper basis for a departure and remanded the
case for resentencing.'
Instances where a downward departure
has been sustained follow the suggested reasons for departures, such
as victim provocationm and coercion of the defendant.26
United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958
(1989). U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 allows for such a departure, but only upon motion of the
government. One district court found U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1's provision that necessitates
a government motion unconstitutional because it "skew[s] the sentencing process
in a way that cannot withstand due process scrutiny." United States v. Curran, 724
F. Supp 1239,1244 (C.D. Ill. 1989). For further criticism of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, see Joel
Cohen & Norman Bloch, Should the Prosecutor Be the Judge of a Defendant's
Cooperation?,N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 1. This type of departure accounts for more
than half of all downward departures from the Guideline sentence. U.S.S.C. ANN.
REP., supra note 5, at 72 (Table R). A recently proposed amendment to U.S.S.G. §
5K1.1 would eliminate the requirement for a government motion to invoke the
departure. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg.
90, 112 (1992). If adopted, the new U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 promises to substantially alter
the government's heretofore dominant role in cooperation departures.
' 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990).
l17d.
at 505.

' The eight factors were: 1) the defendants enjoyed a high degree of
community support; 2) they expressed a high degree of remorse from the first day
of the discovery of the crime; 3) the promptness of restitution; 4) the previous
history and continued community involvement; 5) the behavior was a total
aberration from their previous life history; 6) both defendants have children of a
tender age; 7) the president of the bank recommended leniency; and 8)
incarceration would serve no useful purpose. Id. at 505-06.
' Id. at 508-511. Compare the aspects of this case with the arguments that the
Guidelines do not treat different cases differently. See Robinson's Dissent, supra
note 1, at 18123.
mU.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. See United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650 (8th
Cir. 1989).
251 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12. See United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1989)
(downward departure proper even where the jury rejected a coercion defense in
finding defendant guilty).
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Departures from the Guideline sentence by definition
undermine the sentencing goal of uniformity. The departures by
their nature reflect a consideration that the individual case at bar
somehow deserves different consideration than the typical case upon
which the Guidelines are based. This virtually unfettered discretion
in Guideline departures, however, allows any judge who sees fit the
ability to reduce the Guidelines regulatory effect to a practical nullity
as long as the judge is careful to state any number of various
departure bases on the record. 2 If the Commission is serious
about enforcement of the congressional mandates of uniformity,
while at the same time maintaining some semblance of sentencing
proportionality, it must incorporate sentencing judges' stated reasons
for departures into future Guidelines. It is regrettable that the
Commission will then be acquiescing to a judicial image of
sentencing policy, rather than itself formulating the comprehensive
scheme which Congress envisioned.
V. CONCLUSION

The Commission was presented with an opportunity to
independently execute Congress' effort at "visionary reform."2'
The Guidelines, while a step in that direction, do not do justice to
Congress' vision. The lack of an underlying rationale, the reliance on
previous sentencing methods,' and the grand invitations for
are clearly inapposite to the congressional
departure'
Indeed, the Commission's Annual Report itself details the ease with which
sentencing judges may depart from the Guidelines, even for an obviously improper
purpose. U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 72-73 (Tables Q, R) (showing
improper reasons such as "Punishment," "Deterrence," "Good Character," and "Age"
as reasons given by sentencing courts for departures). Many of the reasons given
for departure are either specifically excluded from consideration by the Guidelines,

or are already accounted for by offense level adjustments.
Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18121.
See id. at 18122-25; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines:
A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 901 (1991) (criticizing sentencing
reform based upon the aggregation of cases).
' See Robert G. Morvillo, Downward Departure, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1991, at 3
("[D]eparture is where judges appear to be re-establishing their sentencing

discretion.").
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mandate. 26 It is entirely probable that, because of the severe time
constraints imposed on the promulgation of the initial set of
Guidelines, the Commission was faced with an impossible mission.
In that case, the Commission does indeed deserve credit for an initial
formulation that, with revision, could in time do justice to an
extraordinary instance of congressional foresight.
Until significant modifications to the Guidelines are
achieved, 7 however, the present Guideline sentencing structure is
inadequate. While the Guidelines do begin to circumscribe the
sentencing judge's discretion, they too often fail to answer the
important questions of who, what, when, where, why, and how.
These important questions, asked of the Commission, instead must
be answered by the same judges whose discretion the Guidelines
were designed to diminish.
There is, however, hope.'
The hope will appear through
the wealth of appellate decisions such as those cited herein. Unlike,
the previous sentencing scheme, in which appellate rulings were
often very narrowly drawn, appellate decisions concerning Guideline
sentencing will enjoy significant precedential value. From these
Robinson's Dissent, supra note 1, at 18125. The author of the dissent has
posed suggestions for improving the Guideline system, id. at 18131-32, and has
developed his own guideline system. See Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for
the 21st Century?, 66 TEx. L. REv 1 (1987). But see Weinstein, supranote 109, at 2, 1017 (discussing the desirability of judicial discretion under the Guidelines).
267 One commentator has even suggested, in light of the shift of sentencing
discretion from judge to prosecutor that "Congress should contemplate establishing
a commission to consider whether guidelines governing the prosecutorial decisionmaking process are appropriate." Arkin, supra note 109, at 3.
2s But see Cabranes, supra note 2, at 2.
There is near consensus among those who know most about the
complex and difficult business of sentencing - trial judges,
probation officers, defense attorneys and many front-line
prosecutors - that there is something profoundly wrong with the
Guidelines system and that substantial reform or abolition is the
answer.... We should face the possibility that the basic premise

of the Guidelines - that the human element should be wiped
away from the sentencing process and replaced by the clean,
sharp edges of a sentencing slide rule - is itself highly
questionable.
Id.; see also Sentencing Proceedings at 6-7, United States v. Tagliamonte, 91 Cr. 50
(KTD) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 1991) (available from Southern District Reporters)
("[A]ttempts by the sentencing commission to categorize things... show how futile
the entire sentencing guideline structure is.").
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decisions, there will emerge a federal common law of Guideline
sentencing.'
These binding sentencing decisions, combined with
2 70
the provisions for reform built into the Guidelines themselves,
should, in time, work toward achieving the goals of the
Guidelines.'
It is unfortunate that this task has fallen from the
hands of the independent Commission,'m into which this vital task
was entrusted, to those of federal judges, 3 who, by virtue of their
' United States District Judge Robert Sweet (S.D.N.Y.) has embraced this view,
suggesting that the Commission "let the majesty of the common law emerge ..
The Next Page in Federal Sentencing, supra note 109, at 19.
27 Amendments to the Guidelines may produce problems in and of themselves,
raising concerns as to which Guideline provisions apply to "straddle offenders,"
defined as defendants whose criminal conduct spans a length of time during which
applicable Guidelines undergo amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Underwood,
932 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991); United States v. Bakker,
925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990)
(ex post facto concerns); see also United States v. Bloom, 945 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1991).
' The Second Circuit has concluded that appellate review of Guideline matters
of first impression will be entertained only if raised first in the district court below.
United States v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1991). In so concluding, the
Second Circuit reversed what it saw as its leniency in Guideline review because the
Guidelines have "come into adolescence, if not full maturity." Id. at 217.
2 The Commission, to its credit, recognizes both the fact that many sentencing
policy decisions continue to be made by appellate courts and that inter-circuit
inconsistency exists. See U.S.S.C. ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 9-19.
' At least one federal judge has resigned, saying, "I just can't, in good
conscience, continue to do this [apply the Guidelines]." CriticizingSentencing Rules,
United States Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22 (quoting United States
District Judge J. Lawrence Irving (S.D. Ca.) as finding the Guidelines too harsh); see
also Judge Spurns Rule on Sentencing; Rejects 17 7/2-Year Term for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21,1991, at 18 (United States District Judge Harold H. Greene (D.D.C.) refusing
to apply the Guideline sentence, finding it "barbaric"). See also United States v.
Terry, Nos. 98 Cr. 0176 (RWS), 90 Cr. 0088 (RWS), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10111
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1991). In Terry, Judge Robert W. Sweet refused to follow the
Guideline sentence of five years for a heroin addict convicted of conspiracy and
possession with intent to distribute. Id. at *4-5. Judge Sweet found the sentence
"draconian." Id. at *5. Judge Sweet had noted on previous occasions his displeasure
with the Guidelines, both in Congressional testimony and in his courtroom
complaint that the Guidelines reduced him to a "clerk." See Deborah Pines,
Guideline Sentence Cut from Five Years to One, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1991, at 1. Judge
Kevin T. Duffy (S.D.N.Y.) commented that the Guidelines are "merely another
example where attempts to quantify human action in portions and give each
portion a number must fail. The only thing that can be guarantied [sic] under the
guidelines is that they will serve injustice." Sentencing Proceedings at 7, United
States v. Tagliamonte, 91 Cr. 50 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 1991) (available from
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positions, necessarily have a skewed view of criminal sentencing.27 4

DarrenM. Gelber
Southern District Reporters). On the other hand, see the statement of United States
District Judge Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.):
Sentencing under the guideline procedure may reduce internal
stress on judges. Most find it extremely difficult to look into the
eye of another human being and punish him severely ...

The

numerical mechanics of the new system avoids emotion. The
guidelines encourage a judge to rule under the illusion that he
or she is no longer personally responsible for a sentencing
decision. Reducing human empathy and judgement with
computer-generated calculations cut the sentence loose from the
three-dimensional defendant, and promises to reduce the
number of sleepless nights and painful choices for judges that
the old system fostered.
Weinstein, supra note 109, at 10-11.
24 See Peter B. Pope, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing
Guidelines, 95 YALE L. J.1258 (1986) (pre-Guidelines).

